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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
MAXIMO RAMON RAMOS, : Case No. 930393-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
testify against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Rule 18(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a 
particular juror and may be taken on one or more of the 
following grounds: 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, 
business, fiduciary or other relationship between 
the prospective juror and any party, witness, or 
person alleged to have been victimized or injured 
by the defendant, which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that 
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling 
to return a verdict which would be free of 
favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be 
disqualified solely because he is indebted to or 
employed by the state or a political subdivision 
thereof; 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part 
of the juror with reference to the cause, or to 
either party, which will prevent him from acting 
impartially and without prejudice to the 
substantial rights of the party challenging; but no 
person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason 
of having formed or expressed an opinion upon the 
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, 
founded upon public rumor, statements in public 
journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily 
appears to the court that the juror can and will, 
notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and 
fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
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Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice/ confusion/ or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence (as amended effective 
October 1, 1992) provides in pertinent part: 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs/ or acts. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to strike 
juror Richard E. Scholle for cause due to bias resulting from 20 
years of employment with law enforcement agencies? 
Standard of review. "A motion to dismiss a prospective 
juror for cause is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
When reviewing such a ruling, we reverse only if the trial court 
has abused its discretion." State v. Woollev, 810 P.2d 440, 442 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). But 
trial courts must adequately probe a juror's potential 
bias when that juror's responses or other facts suggest 
a bias. The court's discretion is properly exercised 
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when deciding whether to dismiss a juror for cause only 
after this investigation takes place. 
Id. Because the trial court failed to probe adequately, his 
determination is entitled to no deference and is reviewed de novo. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting a mug 
shot of defendant into evidence over defendant's objection that it 
was improper evidence of prior bad acts and unduly prejudicial? 
Standard of review. 
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence under rule 403, we will not 
overturn the court's determination unless it was an 
"abuse of discretion." To state the matter more 
precisely, we review the trial court's 403 ruling 
admitting or denying admission to evidence by deciding 
whether, as a matter of law, the trial court's decision 
that "the unfairly prejudicial potential of the evidence 
outweighs [or does not outweigh] its probativeness" was 
beyond the limits of reasonability. Of course, like any 
other evidentiary ruling, an erroneous decision to admit 
or exclude evidence based on rule 4 03 cannot result in 
reversible error unless the error is harmful.25 
25Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 239 (brackets in original) 
(citations omitted); accord Verde, 770 P.2d at 120. 
State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1241 and n.25 (Utah 1993). 
Admission of evidence of prior crimes "is presumed prejudicial and, 
absent a reason for the admission of the evidence other than to 
show criminal disposition, the evidence is Excluded." State v. 
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). 
3. Whether the trial court erred in precluding cross-
examination of Detective Lucas concerning the lengths he is willing 
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to go to obtain convictions, including use of confidential 
informants? 
Standard of Review. Whether evidence is properly 
admissible is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Maximo Ramon Ramos was charged by information dated May 
1, 1992 with distribution, offering agreeing, consenting of 
arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1993). A 
jury trial was held March 16-17, 1993. See transcripts, R. 248-
496, 497-604. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. R. 219. Mr. 
Ramos was sentenced to a term of 1-15 years, stayed pending 
satisfactory completion of probation, including six months in jail, 
$500 fine plus surcharge, $500 restitution, and $300 recoupment to 
LDA. R. 223-4. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The information alleged that Mr. Ramos was involved in a 
sale of cocaine to undercover detective Ed Lucas on January 31, 
1992. R. 7-8. Mr. Ramos was arrested on October 17, 1992 at 9:30 
P.M. R. 10. Trial was held March 16-7, 1993. Potential juror 
Scholle indicated that he had been employed by law enforcement 
agencies for some twenty years as a dispatcher, including "about a 
year with Salt Lake County Police as a dispatcher." R. 316-7. 
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After ascertaining that Mr. Scholle was never involved in 
investigation or court room testimony, the court asked Mr. Scholle 
a single follow-up question: 
THE COURT: Do you think that experience, Mr. 
Scholle, that you described would prevent you from being 
fair and impartial if you were a juror in today's case? 
MR. SCHOLLE: It would affect my opinion. 
R. 317. Although the trial court had previously asked the usual 
question of whether the potential juror would be more inclined to 
believe the testimony of a police officer, R. 309-310, the court 
failed to ask Mr. Scholle this question individually, or further 
probe his attitudes and feelings towards law enforcement officers. 
Defense counsel's challenge for cause, R. 347-8, was denied by the 
court without additional questioning of the potential juror. R. 
348. The defense used its first peremptory challenge on Mr. 
Scholle, and used all four peremptory challenges. R. 153. 
Detective Lucas made an in-court identification of Mr. 
Ramos. R. 3 77. On cross-examination, defense counsel ascertained 
that Detective Lucas did not use any lineup procedures to identify 
Mr. Ramos: 
Q [by Ms. Remal] You haven't participated in 
viewing people in a line up to try and identify which 
person was involved with Mr. Garcia and the transaction 
in this case, have you? 
A [Det. Lucas] It wasn't necessary. 
Q Have you viewed a photo spread, a series of 
photographs, to see if you could identify that person? 
A It took only one to identify it. 
Q And what photograph was that? 
A I am afraid that if I mention that it may 
prejudice the jury. 
R. 439-40. On re-direct, Detective Lucas again testified that he 
confirmed his identification of Mr. Ramos by reviewing a photograph 
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of Mr. Ramos. R. 442-4. This photograph, a "mug shot" of Mr. 
Ramos, was offered as State's Exhibit 3. After an off the record 
discussion, the prosecutor continued re-direct without a ruling 
from the court. R. 444. The mug shot was again offered and the 
trial court expressly reserved ruling until argument could be had 
outside the presence of the jury. R. 446. After the jury was 
dismissed for the day, R. 485, the court heard argument concerning 
whether Exhibit 3 should be received. R. 486-490. The trial court 
allowed the mug shot to come into evidence, but required that the 
booking information and date be excised. R. 490. The frontal and 
profile views were not separated or otherwise disguised. A copy of 
the mug shot as admitted is contained in Addendum A. 
Defense counsel attempted to cross-examine Detective 
Lucas with respect to his use of confidential informants in other 
cases, and the benefits they receive. The State objected, and the 
court sustained the objection after an off the record discussion. 
R. 415. At the conclusion of the first day of trial, defense 
counsel put her objection on the record, indicating that the 
proposed line of questioning went to the detective's motive and 
bias, and bore directly on his credibility. R. 491-2. The trial 
court indicated that "that line of questioning was too far removed 
from the facts of this particular case for it to be relevant, and 
that was the basis of the Court's ruling." R. 4 92-3. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Prospective juror Scholle indicated that he had been 
employed for twenty years by law enforcement agencies l as a 
dispatcher. The trial court failed to adequately probe how this 
experience might affect his ability to give proper credibility to 
witnesses, apply the presumption of innocence, and be fair and 
impartial to both parties. The trial court should have probed 
further, or stricken Mr. Scholle for cause. Because Mr. Ramos was 
forced to utilize a peremptory strike on this juror, Mr. Ramos is 
entitled to a new trial. 
Over objection, the trial court admitted a mug shot of 
Mr. Ramos into evidence. The investigating detective had already 
made a positive in-court identification, and defendant did not 
challenge the detective's ability to identify Mr. Ramos. This mug 
shot should have been excluded as evidence of prior bad acts. The 
mug shot was not needed by the prosecution, was obviously a mug 
shot taken by a law enforcement agency, was taken at some time 
prior to the instant offense, and its alteration between the time 
that the detective viewed it before the jury and the time it was 
submitted to the jury with one quarter of the photo cut away only 
served to emphasize the prejudicial nature of the photo. The photo 
was improperly admitted, and prejudiced the jury against Mr. Ramos. 
Mr. Ramos is entitled to a new trial at which the mug shot is 
suppressed. 
Defense counsel sought to cross-examine the investigating 
detective as to the measures he takes in other cases to obtain 
8 
convictions, as such measures relate to his bias and motive to 
testify. The trial court ruled that such measures were irrelevant. 
Evidence of bias and motive is always relevant. Limiting cross-
examination on these matters violated Mr. Ramos' right to 
confrontation under the sixth amendment and article I, section 12 
of the Utah Constitution. Mr. Ramos is entitled to a new trial 
where his right to cross-examine witnesses is not unduly curtailed. 
Even if individually some of these errors are not 
reversible, the cumulative effect of these errors requires that Mr. 
Ramos be given a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
STRIKE A POTENTIAL JUROR FOR CAUSE. 
The trial court erroneously denied defense counsel's 
challenge for cause to potential juror Scholle. R. 348. Rule 
18(e) (14), Utah R. Crim. P., provides that a challenge for cause 
may be made on the grounds 
that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with 
reference to the cause, or to either party, which will 
prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice 
to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but 
no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of 
having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or 
cause to be submitted to such jury . . . if it 
satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror can 
and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially 
and fairly upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
Rule 18(e)(4) provides that a challenge for cause may be made on 
the grounds of 
the existence of any . . . business . . . or other 
relationship between the prospective juror and any party 
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[or] witness, . . . which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the 
prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return 
a verdict which would be free of favoritism. 
Juror Scholle indicated that he was employed for twenty 
years as a police dispatcher, including "about a year with Salt 
Lake County Police as a dispatcher." R. 316-7. The trial court 
briefly explored and ascertained that Mr. Scholle was never 
involved in the investigation phase of any criminal activity, and 
had never testified in court on any police matter. The court then 
asked Mr. Scholle only one follow-up question: 
THE COURT: Do you think that experience, Mr. 
Scholle, that you described would prevent you from being 
fair and impartial if you were a juror in today's case? 
MR. SCHOLLE: It would affect my opinion. 
R. 317. Although the trial court had previously asked the usual 
question of whether any potential juror would be more inclined to 
believe the testimony of a police officer,1 R. 309-310, the court 
failed to ask Mr. Scholle this question individually, or further 
probe his attitudes and feelings towards law enforcement officers. 
The question that was asked, and the answer given, do 
nothing to dispel the inference of bias raised by Mr. Scholle's 
employment in law enforcement agencies. The transcript indicates 
that Mr. Scholle would be affected as a result of his employment 
igee, e.g.. State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 767-8 (Utah 1980) 
("Are there any of you who would be inclined to give the testimony 
of a Peace Officer greater weight . . . ") ; State v. Gray, 851 P. 2d 
1217, 1223 (Utah App. 1993) ("is there anything in that experience 
. . . that would make you want to give more or less weight to the 
testimony of police officers"); State v. Kavmark, 839 P.2d 860, 
865 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah App. 
1992) ("do you think that fact would make you want to give more or 
less weight to the testimony of a police officer"). 
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history in law enforcement. Even if he had indicated an ability to 
be fair and impartial, such responses carry little weight. "A 
statement made by a juror that she intends to be fair and impartial 
loses much of its meaning in light of other testimony and facts 
which suggest a bias." Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P. 2d 533, 536 (Utah 
1981) (citing Lambert v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 560 P.2d 
262 (Or. 1977). 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently 
emphasized that "it is [the trial judge's] duty to see 
that the constitutional rights of an accused to an 
impartial jury is safeguarded," State v. Dixon, 560 P.2d 
318, 319-20 (Utah 1977), and has reversed criminal 
convictions based solely on the appearance that such 
right may have been jeopardized. Accordingly, trial 
courts must adequately probe a juror's potential bias 
when that juror's responses or other facts suggest a 
bias. The court's discretion is properly exercised when 
deciding whether to dismiss a juror for cause only after 
this investigation takes place. 
State v. Woollev, 810 P. 2d 440, 442 (Utah App.) (emphasis in 
original, footnote omitted), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 
1991) ; accord State v. Bovatt, 854 P.2d 550 (Utah App. 1993) . 
The level of investigation necessary once voir 
dire reveals potential juror bias will vary from case to 
case and is necessarily dependant on the juror's 
responses to the questions asked. Nevertheless, the 
exploration should not merely be pro forma. 
When an inference of bias is raised, the 
inference is generally not rebutted simply by a 
subsequent general statement by the juror that he or she 
can be fair and impartial. As the supreme court has 
stated, " [a] statement made by a juror that she intends 
to be fair and impartial loses much of its meaning in 
light of other testimony and facts which suggest a bias." 
State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26 [(Utah 1984)] (quoting 
Jenkins fv. Parrish] , 627 P.2d [533] at 536 [(Utah 
1981)]) . 
Woolley, 810 P. 2d at 445. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of 
the accused. Hawkins v. State, 717 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Okla. Crim. 
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App. 1986). " [T] he exercise of the trial court's discretion in 
selecting a fair and impartial jury must be viewed 'in light of the 
fact that it is a simple matter to obviate any problem of bias 
simply by excusing the prospective juror and selecting another.'" 
Woolley, 810 P.2d at 442 (quoting Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 
536 (Utah 1981). 
Rebuttal of an inference of bias is "accomplished by a 
showing that the statement was merely the product of a ' light 
impression' and not one that would 'close the mind against the 
testimony that may be offered in opposition.'" State v. Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988) (quoting State v. Bailev, 605 P.2d 
765, 768 (Utah 1980)); accord State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1127 
(Utah 1989), State v. Kavmark, 839 P.2d 860, 862 (Utah App. 1992). 
The rehabilitative efforts of the trial judge in this 
case were inadequate, and at most pro forma. A comparison with the 
rehabilitation conducted in State v. Bovatt, No. 920577-CA (Utah 
App. May 7, 1993) (nine questions used to rehabilitate), Cobb, 774 
P.2d at 1126-8 (eleven rehabilitative questions), State v. 
Gotschall, 782 P. 2d 459 (Utah 1989) (fourteen rehabilitative 
questions), and State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1989) (twenty 
rehabilitative questions) reveals the superficiality and 
inconclusive nature of the rehabilitation efforts here. The trial 
court's only rehabilitative question failed to dispel the inference 
of bias and partiality raised by Mr. Scholle's employment with law 
enforcement agencies for twenty years. 
12 
The Utah Supreme Court has explored the purpose of voir 
dire in depth in State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988) : 
All that is necessary for a voir dire question to be 
appropriate is that it allow "defense counsel to exercise 
his peremptory challenges more intelligently." [State v. 
Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984)]. Peremptory 
challenges are designed to allow an attorney to remove a 
juror, not because he or she is prejudiced as to the 
particular facts of the case, but for "more general biases 
that affect how a juror may perceive and evaluate 
witnesses, parties, and evidence. Juror attitudes 
revealed during voir dire may indicate dimly perceived, 
yet deeply rooted, psychological biases or prejudices 
that may not rise to the level of a for-cause challenge 
but nevertheless support a peremptory challenge. Thus, 
trial counsel should be given considerable latitude in 
asking voir dire questions, especially in view of the 
fact that only counsel will, at the beginning, have a 
clear overview of the entire case and the type of 
evidence likely to be adduced. Voir dire should not be 
restricted to a "stark little exercise" which discloses 
little. rPeoole v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869, 873 (Cal. 
1981)] . 
Accord State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797-8 (Utah 1991). 
In this case, voir dire was inadequate to properly assess 
challenges for cause, much less allow counsel to explore "dimly 
perceived, yet deeply rooted, psychological biases or prejudices." 
Mr. Scholle's employment in law enforcement for twenty years raised 
at least an inference of bias and partiality, which the trial court 
failed to dispel. 
Forcing the defense to use a peremptory strike to remove 
a juror who should have been stricken for cause is prejudicial. 
E.g. , Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 461; Julian, 771 P.2d at 1064; 
Woolley, 810 P. 2d at 443. For cases reversing specifically for 
failure to strike a law enforcement agency employee for cause, see 
e.g. State v. West, 200 S.E.2d 859, 864-6 (W.Va. 1973) ("[W]hen 
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the defendant can demonstrate even a tenuous relationship between 
a prospective juror and any prosecutorial or enforcement arm of 
State government, defendant's challenge for cause should be 
sustained by the court."); Hutcheson v. State, 268 S.E.2d 643, 644 
(Ga. 1980) (when police officers are challenged for cause in 
criminal case, the challenge must be granted); State v. Mitchell, 
475 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1985) (failure to excuse reserve 
police officer was reversible error). 
Mr. Ramos is entitled to a fair, impartial jury by the 
sixth amendment and Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
As a result of Mr. Scholle's potential bias, and the court's 
failure to explore further or remove him for cause, Mr. Ramos's 
constitutional rights have been violated. Mr. Ramos is entitled to 
a new trial. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
THE MUG SHOT OF MR. RAMOS INTO EVIDENCE. 
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in conformity 
therewith." Rule 404(b). 
Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible at 
trial provided it has "a special relevance to a 
controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose other 
than to show the defendant's predisposition to 
criminality." State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424, 426 
(Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295 
(Utah 1988) ) . 
State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1990). See also State v. 
Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). 
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In this case, the mug shot of Mr. Ramos was purportedly 
introduced to bolster the identification of Mr. Ramos by Detective 
Lucas. R. 442-6. However, Detective Lucas positively identified 
Mr. Ramos, and his mug shot was thus unnecessary. Mr. Ramos's mug 
shot was not probative of any other element of the crime with which 
he was charged. "The only possible effect of such testimony could 
have would be to leave an impression with the jury of defendant's 
bad character. The admission of the testimony was therefore 
prejudicial." State v. Pacheco, 712 P. 2d 192, 195 (Utah 1985) 
(involving prejudicial statements concerning a prior robbery), cert 
denied, 479 U.S. 813, 107 S.Ct. 64, 93 L.Ed.2d 22 (1986). 
Even if the mug shot had probative value, it was still 
subject to the balancing test of Rule 403. Cox, 787 P.2d at 5. 
The probative value of the mug shot of Mr. Ramos, was far 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Admission of evidence of 
prior crimes "is presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason for the 
admission of the evidence other than to show criminal disposition, 
the evidence is excluded." Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741. 
Only one Utah case directly addresses2 the admissibility 
of mug shots to show identification. In State v. Albretson, 782 
P. 2d 515 (Utah 1989), defendant was charged with assaulting a woman 
with a club in her own home after she returned home from work. The 
2See also State v. Owens, 388 P.2d 797 (Utah 1964) (where no 
objection was made in trial court, admission of mug shots on the 
issue of identification was not error); State v. McCardell, 652 
P.2d 942, 945-7 (Utah 1982) ("While McCardell's arguments on this 
point clearly have merit, we must be satisfied . . . that he has 
complied with . . . the 'contemporaneous objection rule.'"; since 
there was no objection, the issue was not addressed on the merits) . 
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victim identified her assailant from a binder containing 30 to 50 
mug shots. In holding the mug shots admissible, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
Even though we recognize that under rule 403, they could 
still be excluded, the mug shots here were crucial in 
establishing the identity of defendant, which was the 
main issue. They were the initial source of [the 
victim] 's identification, and they explained her reaction 
when she identified him as her-attacker. Also, admitting 
the mug shots served to rebut defendant's theory that 
later identifications by her were connected to the mug 
shots rather than to the attacker. 
Albretson, 782 P.2d at 517. 
The Supreme Court quoted People v. Travier, 197 N.W.2d 
890 (Mich. App. 1972): 
[I]t would be better if the jury was not allowed to see 
mug shots of the defendant. However, where, as here, 
defense counsel has made an issue of the witness's 
ability to recognize the defendant from the picture he 
was shown by the police, it was not improper for the 
trial court to admit the photos. 
Id. at 892. 
Here, the initial source of Detective Lucas's 
identification was a prescription pill bottle. A check on the 
telephone of the residence "came back to a Rolondo Ramos." 
Detective Lucas verified that Mr. Ramos occasionally went by the 
name of Rolondo. R. 442. Defense counsel never challenged the 
identification Detective Lucas made of Mr. Ramos, from Mr. Ramos's 
mug shot or otherwise. Instead, the defense argued alibi. See R. 
362-4 (opening statement) , 575 (closing) , and 582-3 (closing) . The 
issue here is not whether Detective Lucas actually became 
acquainted with Mr. Ramos; rather, the issue is whether the person 
who accompanied Detective Lucas on this particular drug buy was Mr. 
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Ramos, when both Mr. Ramos and his wife (then fiance) testified 
that he was in his fiancee's apartment. By its facts, Albretson is 
not determinative here. 
A. THE STATE FAILED TO MEET THE PRE-
REQUISITES OF THE TEST IN HARRINGTON. 
A three pronged test for considering whether to introduce 
mug shots was enunciated in United States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 
487 (2nd Cir. 1973) : 
We perceive three prerequisites to a ruling that the 
introduction of "mug shot" type photographs does not 
result in reversible error: 
1. The Government must have a demonstrable need 
to introduce the photographs; and 
2. The photographs themselves, if shown to the 
jury, must not imply that the accused has a 
prior criminal record; and 
3. The manner of introduction at trial must be 
such that it does not draw particular 
attention to the source or implications of the 
photographs. 
Id. at 494. 
A number of courts have adopted the three pronged test of 
Harrington. See United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 214 (1st 
Cir. 1978); Ingram v. State, 755 P.2d 120, 122 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1988); State v. Kutzen, 620 P.2d 258, 263 (Haw. App. 1980); Redd 
v. Commonwealth, 591 S.W.2d 704 (Ky. App. 1979) (as approved by the 
Kentucky Supreme Court in Brown v. Commonwealth, 763 S.W.2d 128, 
130 (Ky. 1989)); State v. Denson, 237 S.E.2d 761 (S.C. 1977);3 
United States v. Bowers, 567 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir.), cert, denied. 
3See also State v. Robinson, 262 S.E.2d 729 (S.C. 1980) ; State 
v. Tate, 341 S.E.2d 380 (S.C. 1986). 
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435 U.S. 976, 98 S. Ct. 1627, 56 L.Ed.2d 71 (1978); Holsclaw v. 
State, 364 So.2d 378 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert, denied, 364 So.2d 382 
(Ala. 1978); and Sloane v. State, 437 So.2d 16, 18 (Miss. 1983). 
Utah should likewise adopt the Harrington test. 
1. The State Had No Demonstrable Need 
to Introduce the Mug Shot of Mr. 
Ramos. 
The State fails to meet the first prerequisite of the 
Harrington test: that the state has a demonstrable need to 
introduce the mug shots. Introduction was thus reversible error, 
and Mr. Ramos should be granted a new trial. 
The State introduced the mug shot of Mr. Ramos to bolster 
the identification made by Detective Lucas. In trial, the 
detective was clear and unequivocal about the identification he 
made. R. 441-4. Thus, his identification needed no additional 
corroboration: 
The existence of some need to prove identification 
does not open the door to the manner of proof used here. 
Barnes itself involved a probative purpose; the defense 
had attacked the witness's identification capacity. But 
"mug shots" were rejected because of an adequate 
alternative means of proof. In appellant Jones' case, 
the testimony of the witness and the officer as to the 
conduct of the photographic array, coupled with the 
resulting positive identification, made evidentiary use 
of the photos themselves superfluous. 
Williams v. United States, 382 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir. 1978). 
In Tate, the South Carolina Supreme Court found: 
The victim positively identified appellant in court, and 
there was testimony by Detective Parris that she had 
picked appellant out of a photographic lineup. Given 
this competent evidence proving identity, we fail to see 
the demonstrable need to introduce the "mug shot." 
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Tate, 341 S.E.2d at 381. The case was reversed on this basis. 
In Kutzen, the court observed that "the admission of the 
photographs into evidence after [the witness] made an unequivocal 
in-court identification of the defendants was unnecessary." The 
case was reversed on this basis. See also State v. Kelly, 526 
P.2d 720, 729 (Ariz. 1974) ("In the instant case, the picture was 
introduced by the prosecution after the defendant had been 
positively identified. The introduction of the enlarged 'mug shot' 
served no useful purpose in further identifying the defendant. 
. . . Such over-reaching by the prosecution is the stuff that 
reversals are made of and was clearly error."), cert, denied, 420 
U.S. 935, 95 S.Ct. 1143, 43 L.Ed.2d 411 (1975); Holsclaw, 364 
So.2d at 381 (two reliable in-court identifications negated any 
finding of demonstrable need; held reversible error); Sloane, 437 
So. 2d at 18 (no demonstrable need where one witness made a positive 
in-court identification; held reversible error); Blue v. State, 
235 N.E.2d 471, 475 (Ind. 1968) ("It should also be noted that 
where the witness positively identifies the defendant in the Court 
room as the felon; "mug shots" introduced as evidence going to 
identification are irrelevant, and of no probative value . . . ."; 
pre-Harrington case, held reversible error). 
In Ingram, defendant's appearance changed radically 
between the time of the crime and trial. A very full beard was 
shaved, long hair was cut, and defendant had gained 60-80 pounds. 
The court found that photographic evidence to show defendant's 
appearance at the time of the crime was crucial to the State's 
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case, but held that a driver's license photo was more than adequate 
to serve that function. There was thus no demonstrable need to 
introduce the mug shot. 
This case is easily distinguishable from Albretson, where 
this court held admission of a mug shot permissible. In that case, 
defendant made an issue of the victim's ability to recognize the 
perpetrator from a mug shot photo lineup. The victim's original 
statements concerning identification were equivocal. Here, the mug 
shot of Mr. Ramos was not demonstrably needed. Defense counsel did 
not assert that the photograph viewed by Detective Lucas was 
unrepresentative of Mr. Ramos, or that Detective Lucas erred in his 
identification. No issue was made of the detective's ability to 
recognize Mr. Ramos from the picture. Cf. Albretson; Travier, 
197 N.W.2d at 892. Detective Lucas himself testified that Mr. 
Ramos's appearance had not changed, except that Mr. Ramos had more 
gray hair at the time of the offense. R. 401. Detective Lucas 
positively identified Mr. Ramos in court, and that identification 
was not challenged by the defense. 
The State has failed to meet the demonstrable need 
prerequisite of the Harrington test. Mr. Ramos is entitled to a 
new trial. 
2. The Mug Shot Itself Implied that Mr. 
Ramos has a Prior Criminal Record. 
Excision of the booking information from the mug shot did 
not in any way disguise the mug shot, or reduce its prejudicial 
effect. To the contrary, the removed portion of the photograph 
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likely aroused the jury's curiosity, and caused the jury to 
speculate as to what may have been removed. The State fails to 
satisfy the second prerequisite of the Harrington test, and Mr. 
Ramos is thus entitled to a new trial. 
Courts have emphasized the universally recognized 
characteristics of the mug shot and the accompanying inference of 
criminal activity. In Barnes v. United States, 365 F.2d 509, 510-
11 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court commented: 
The double-shot picture, with front and profile shots 
alongside each other, is so familiar, from "wanted" 
posters in the post office, motion pictures and 
television, that the inference that the person involved 
has a criminal record, or has at least been in trouble 
with the police, is natural, perhaps automatic. 
In Barnes, the mug shot had tape placed over the legends before 
admission into evidence. The court further commented: 
The rudimentary tape cover placed over the prison numbers 
on the photograph, and over the notations on the reverse 
side, neither disguised the nature of the picture nor 
avoided the prejudice. If anything, by emphasizing that 
something was being hidden, the steps taken here to 
disguise the nature of the picture may well have 
heightened the importance of the picture and the 
prejudice in the minds of the jury. 
Id. 
New York has also recognized the inherent difficulties of 
remedial efforts. In People v. Carroll, 61 A.D.2d 760, 402 
N.Y.S.2d 8, 8-9 (N.Y.App.Div. 1978), the court noted that " [w]hile 
the prison numerals across defendant's chest were taped over in the 
photographs, this could have had the effect of emphasizing their 
nature rather than ameliorating the problem.". 
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In People v. Clark, 297N.E.2d395 (111. App. 1973), the 
court reasoned that: 
[A]n examination of the mug shots after the deletion 
could only lead the jury to speculate as to what 
information the deleted portion of the photograph had 
contained. The prejudicial effect of such evidence is of 
such magnitude as to overcome any relevancy or probative 
value that it may have had. 
Id. at 397.4 
See also Brown, 763 S.W.2d at 130 ("Despite the removal 
of identifying numbers, it was obvious that the photographs 
introduced into evidence were mug shots."); Ingram, 755 P.2d at 
122 ("no reasonable juror could fail to know from viewing this mug 
shot in the form submitted that appellant had previously been in 
trouble with the law"); Blue, 235 N.E.2d at 474 ("These 
photographs are highly prejudicial upon sight and may very easily 
create an unfavorable automatic reaction in a juror's mind without 
further investigation by him."); State v. Cumbo, 451 P.2d 333, 
336 (Ariz. 1969) ("It is this Court's opinion that the double-shot 
picture with front and profile alongside each other, unless 
disguised so as not to appear to be a 'mug shot', and absent an 
explanation that the picture was taken at defendant's arrest on the 
charge involved, intimates to the jury that defendant had a prior 
criminal record."). 
At minimum, the side view shot should have been removed 
in addition to removing or covering the booking information, as 
4In Clark, the issue was not adequately preserved, but the 
court nevertheless reversed on the basis of plain error. With a 
proper objection before the court, as here, there is no excuse for 
failing to exclude the mug shot. 
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occurred in Sanchez v. State, 751 P.2d 1300, 1303-4 (Wyo. 1988), 
and People v. Pickett, 571 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Colo. 1977). The Utah 
Supreme Court requires no less: 
When suggestive material is masked, the curiosity of the 
jury is increased. Trial courts should employ safeguards 
to disguise the origin of police photographs/ including 
the removal of police identification numbers, United 
States v. Watts, 532 F.2d 1215, 1217 (8th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 429 U.S. 847, 97 S. Ct. 131, 50 L.Ed.2d 119 
(1976), and separating the combined profile and frontal 
views characteristic of mug shots. Id. 
Albretson, 782 P.2d at 517-8 (emphasis added). Although requested 
to separate the profile and frontal views by defense counsel, R. 
488,5 the trial court refused to separate the two views. R. 490. 
The photograph here was obviously a mug shot, implying 
prior offenses, and should have been excluded. The cropped version 
published to the jury only accentuated the fact that this was a mug 
shot and information concerning prior crimes was being hidden from 
the jury. The State has failed to meet the second prerequisite of 
the Harrington test, and Mr. Ramos is entitled to a new trial. 
3. The Manner of Introduction Attracted 
Additional Attention to the Mug Shot, and 
its Probable Source. 
The third prerequisite of the Harrington test requires 
that the method of introduction at trial not draw particular 
attention to the source or implications of the photograph. The 
5
"If we could somehow fix the photograph so that the side view 
was taken away and chopped off the bottom of the frontal view so 
that it is not clear what it is from, it would look rather odd but 
I don't think that the same prejudice would be inherent in it." 
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State also fails to satisfy this prong of the test. Mr. Ramos is 
entitled to a new trial. 
The mug shot here was clearly not taken incident to this 
offense. Detective Lucas unambiguously testified that he reviewed 
the photograph shortly after the transaction, many months prior to 
Mr. Ramos's arrest. The inference of prior criminal activity was 
inescapable, violating Rules 403 and 404(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
In Blue, 235 N.E.2d at 475, the Indiana Supreme Court 
noted: 
It is hardly an unreasonable assumption to make, that the 
jurors would know that these photos were taken incidental 
to an arrest or prison term and would not make the minute 
distinction as to when they were taken. They could 
readily assume that the subject depicted had a criminal 
record. These photographs are highly prejudicial upon 
sight and may very easily create an unfavorable automatic 
reaction in a juror's mind without further investigation 
by him. 
See also Ingram, 755 P. 2d at 122 (" [T] he jurors knew that the 
witnesses picked this mug shot from the photographic lineup three 
months before appellant's arrest. Consequently, the jurors knew 
this photograph was taken in connection with another, previous, 
crime."). 
This is not a case such as People v. Thatcher, 638 P.2d 
760, 769 (Colo. 1981), where the jury would naturally assume that 
the mug shot was generated in conjunction with the case being 
tried. Here, Detective Lucas testified that he reviewed the mug 
shot prior to Mr Ramos's arrest for this offense. 
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By cutting away fully a quarter of the picture after the 
whole photograph was shown to a testifying witness, the prejudice 
to Mr. Ramos was exacerbated. The photograph was whole when 
reviewed by Detective Lucas in the presence of the jury. Removing 
a substantial portion of the photograph likely aroused the jury's 
curiosity, causing the jury to speculate as to the removed 
information and the nature of Mr. Ramos's prior dealings with the 
police. 
Finally, Detective Lucas himself indicated the 
prejudicial nature of the photograph: 
Q And what photograph was that? 
A I am afraid that if I mention that it may 
prejudice the jury. 
R. 439-40. Surely this aroused the jury's curiosity. After this 
statement by the investigating detective, the trial court's abuse 
of discretion in admitting the mug shot is only more egregious. 
The manner of introduction heightened the jury's 
awareness of the prejudicial nature of the mug shot. The State has 
failed to satisfy the third prerequisite of the Harrington test, 
and Mr. Ramos is entitled to a new trial. 
B. ADMISSION OF MR. RAMOS' MUG SHOT WAS 
PREJUDICIAL. 
Under the facts of this case, admission of Mr. Ramos's 
mug shot into evidence could not have been harmless error. This 
case involved a credibility battle between Detective Lucas, 
testifying that Mr. Ramos was present when the drug transaction 
occurred, and Mr. Ramos and his wife Maria Reyes Ramos, both 
25 
testifying that he was in her apartment the entire day when the 
alleged transaction occurred. The prejudicial inference that Mr. 
Ramos had prior dealings with the police could well have been what 
tipped the scales towards conviction. 
The jury in this case was probably influenced by the mug 
shot of Mr. Ramos and the necessary implication that he had prior 
involvement with the police. Absent such evidence, the jury might 
have rendered a more favorable verdict. Introduction of the mug 
shot was not harmless error. As set forth above, numerous courts 
in similar cases have held admission of mug shots to be prejudicial 
error. E.g., Barnes, Blue, Carroll, Clark, Fosher, Harrington, 
Holsclaw, Ingram, Kutzen, Sloane, Tate, and Williams. This case 
must also be reversed. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING 
THAT EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE LENGTHS 
DETECTIVE LUCAS WAS WILLING TO GO TO WAS 
IRRELEVANT AS IT BORE ON HIS CREDIBILITY, 
MOTIVE, AND BIAS. 
Defense counsel sought to probe the lengths to which 
Detective Lucas was willing to go to obtain convictions, but this 
line of inquiry was foreclosed by the trial court: 
Q [By Ms. Remal] Another possible way [to make it 
worth an informant's while] would be if those individuals 
were already charged with something, the charges might be 
dismissed or decreased in severity? 
MS. MC CLOSKEY: Your Honor, I am going to 
object to this. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
MS. REMAL: Your Honor, may we approach the 
bench? 
THE COURT: You may. 
(Off the record discussion between Court and 
counsel.) 
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THE COURT: You may go forward, Ms. Remal, 
and the objection is sustained. 
R. 415:4-16. After the jury was dismissed for the first day of 
trial, the objection, argument, and ruling were placed on the 
record: 
MS. REMAL: If you recall, I was cross 
examining Det. Lucas and started tcr ask him questions 
about his occasional use of confidential informants and 
what, if any, benefit those confidential informants 
received in exchange for working with him and giving him 
information. And I believe the question I had asked or 
was into asking had to do with whether or not sometimes 
charges are dismissed, or the seriousness decreased in 
exchange for information they gave, and I believe it was 
at that point that Ms. Mc Closkey objected. What I 
indicated to you at the bench and what I indicate now, is 
that my reason for pursuing that line of questioning was 
to show whether or not there was any potential bias or 
motive of Det. Lucas and this is what I meant by that. 
It appears to me that it is an argument that is 
appropriate for me to make, especially in a case such as 
this where the credibility of Det. Lucas is crucial to 
the case at all. That the fact that he has at times gone 
to great lengths in order to pursue his goal of fighting 
drug use and fighting drug trafficking is very important. 
MS. MC CLOSKEY: Your Honor, my objection 
was based on relevance. . . . 
THE COURT: The record may reflect, as well, 
the Court did deny Ms. Remal an opportunity to pursue 
that line of questioning and the Court determined that 
that line of questioning was too far removed from the 
facts of this particular case for it to be relevant, and 
that was the basis of the Court's ruling. 
R. 491-3. 
A. EVIDENCE OF BIAS AND MOTIVE IS ALWAYS 
RELEVANT. 
The trial court's ruling that this evidence was 
irrelevant is incorrect: 
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Evidence of bias or motive is not introduced for the 
purposes of attacking or supporting a witness' general 
credibility, though it may have that effect. Rather, 
evidence of bias or motive is "' alv/ays relevant as 
discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his 
testimony.'" Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 
S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (quoting 3A J. 
Wigmore, Evidence § 940, at 775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)). 
State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 203 (Utah 1987) . Accord, State v. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah 1989). 
Although Hackford deals specifically with an objection 
sustained incorrectly on Rule 608(b) grounds, the relevance 
objection pressed by the State here is similarly unavailing. 
Evidence of bias or motive is always relevant. "The limitations on 
the right to cross-examine regarding bias can be best summarized by 
saying that the right is limited by Utah Rule of Evidence 403." 
Hackford, 737 P.2d at 203. 
Here, the trial judge never made it to a rule 4 03 
balancing test. Under the facts of this case, the result of such 
a balancing would have to be in favor of admission of the evidence. 
The evidence was not prejudicial to the State, confusing, 
misleading, cumulative, nor a waste of time. The trial court's 
determination that the proposed line of inquiry involved irrelevant 
matters was incorrect. Matters going to bias and motive are always 
relevant. The cross-examination on motive and bias should not have 
been curtailed. 
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B. LIMITING CROSS EXAMINATION OF DETECTIVE 
LUCAS ON BIAS AND MOTIVE VIOLATED MR. 
RAMOS' RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION UNDER THE 
SIXTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 
12. 
The sixth amendment and article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to confront 
witnesses against him.6 
"There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which [the Supreme 
Court] and other courts have been more nearly unanimous 
than in their expressions of belief that the right to 
confrontation is an essential and fundamental requirement 
for the kind of fair trial which is this country's 
constitutional goal." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 
405, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). The 
right to test the believability of a witness on cross-
examination includes the right to show a witness' 
possible bias or interest. The exposure of a witness' 
motivation in testifying is a proper and important 
function of the constitutionally protected right of 
cross-examination. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496, 
79 S.Ct. 1400, 1413, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959). 
State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 656 (Utah 1985) (brackets in 
original) . See also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-9, 
106 S.Ct. 1431, , 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 683 (1986). 
The Utah Supreme Court "has been careful to allow wide 
latitude for examination in the areas of bias and motive." State 
v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 499 (Utah 1986) (citing State v. Maestas, 
564 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1977)). 
[T] he scope of cross-examination as to credibility is and 
must be broad if it is to fulfill its designated purpose 
of exposing bias and purging testimony of intended or 
unintended error. Full exposure of a witness' bias or 
prejudice is essential if a jury is to be able to fully 
assess the existence and extent of the witness' bias. 
Stevens v. Bordenkircher, 746 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 
6See also Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-1 (1992), providing that all 
witnesses may be examined as to their motives. 
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1984); United States v. Bleckner, 601 F„2d 382, 385 (9th 
Cir. 1979). 
Leonard, 707 P. 2d at 656. This rule has long standing in Utah. 
See e.g.. State v. Cerar, 207 P. 597, 602 (Utah 1922) ("The 
interest of a witness in any particular case in which he becomes a 
witness may always be shown . . . ") . In this case, Mr. Ramos' 
right to confrontation was infringed by the trial court's 
limitation of cross-examination. 
C. THE LIMITATION IMPOSED ON DEFENSE 
COUNSEL'S CROSS-EXAMINATION FOR MOTIVE 
AND BIAS WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
The constitutional harmless error standard applies to 
wrongful limitation of cross-examination for motive and bias. 
State v. Patterson, 656 P.2d 438, 439 (Utah 1982); State v. 
Chestnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980); but see Hackford, 737 
P. 2d at 204 (dictum indicating that issue has yet to be fully 
analyzed). Under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 
17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) , the burden is on the State to show that the 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This case boils down to a credibility battle between 
Detective Lucas on the one hand, and Mr. Ramos and his wife on the 
other. Denying the defense a full opportunity to explore Detective 
Lucas' motivations and biases directly impacts the outcome of this 
credibility battle. The State cannot show that this error is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Ramos is entitled to a new 
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trial, at which the motivations and biases of Detective Lucas may 
be fully explored. 
Even under the normal harmless error standard, in a case 
such as this involving a credibility battle and no other 
corroborative evidence, there is always a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable result had full cross-examination been allowed. 
Cases have been reversed specifically due to limitation of cross-
examination of a police officer. See e.g. State v. Hubbard, 688 
P.2d 1311, 1320-1 (Or. 1984) (cited in State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 
498, 500 (Utah 1986)). Mr. Ramos is entitled to a new trial at 
which he may fully cross-examine Detective Lucas as to his bias and 
motive in testifying. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's errors in (1) failing to adequately 
probe juror Scholle's bias or strike him for cause, (2) admitting 
Mr. Ramos' mug shot into evidence, and (3) limiting cross-
examination of the investigating detective, either individually or 
cumulatively require that Mr. Ramos' conviction be reversed and 
that he be given a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £3*JL day of November, 1993. 
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ROBERT K/ HEINEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Mug shot of Mr. Ramos (State's Exhibit 3) 

